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THE AMENDMENTS TO RULE 12 OF THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE*
JOHN A. BAUMAN**
ULE 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides
for and regulates the presentation of defenses and ob-
jections to pleadings.' The rule was amended to discourage at-
tacks on the form of the pleadings, and to facilitate settlement
of cases on the merits.2 The thought is that the formal plead-
ings can do little more than furnish a general notice of the
claim, and that the issue forming and discovering functions
should be left to the other more effective devices provided for
by the Rules. s While the amendments are said to codify the
better practice which existed under the rules as originally
drafted,4 they emphasize again that pleadings are relegated to
a minor role in the federal system of procedure. A discussion
of the amendments to Rule 12 will reveal the correctness of
these suggestions.
Rule 12 (b) as originally drafted provided for two methods
of raising defenses to a claim. It first provided that every
defense, in law or fact, could be raised by a responsive plead-
ing.5 It then provided that six defenses could be made by a
motion.6 These six defenses were lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, lack of jurisdiction over the person, improper
* This comment was prepared as a lecture delivered before the Albuquerque,
New Mexico, Lawyers' Club.
** Assistant Professor of Law, University of New Mexico. Member of the law
faculty of the University of North Dakota and Faculty Advisor to the student
editorial staff of the North Dakota Bar Briefs during the Summer Session of
1949.
1 28 U.S.C.A. following §723 (c) (Supp. 1949).
2Clark, Experience Under the Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 8 F.R.D. 497, 501 (1949); Clark, The Amended Federal Rules, 15
Brooklyn L. Rev. 1, 9-11 (1948).
s Clark, The Amended Federal Rules, 15 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1, 9 (1948); Clark,
Simplified Pfeading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 460-62 (1943). For a criticism of this idea, see
McCaskill, Easy Pleading, 35 Ill. L. Rev. 28 (1940). For reply, see Fisher, A
Vindication of Simplified Pleading, 35 Ill. L. Rev. 270 (1940).
4Clark, Experience Under the Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 8 F.R.D. 487, 501 (1949).
5 This is the English method. See the Rules of the Supreme Court (England),
Order XXV, Rules 1-3 (1883); Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 464-67
(1943).
6 As to whether these six defenses are to be raised by a motion to dismiss in
every case, see Brown, Some Problems Concerning Motions Under Federal Rule
12(b), 27 Minn. L. Rev. 415, 415-19 (1943) (in cases where the defense is (4)
insufficiency of process and (5) insufficiency of service of process, such defense
should be raised by motion to quash).
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venue, insufficiency of process, insufficiency of service of pro-
cess, and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.7
This subdivision of Rule 12 was amended in two ways: first
by adding a seventh defense that may be raised by motion,
namely, the failure to join an indispensable party; and, second,
by providing that when extraneous evidence is admitted by
a court in support of a motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim, such motion is to be treated as one for summary judg-
ment and disposed of as provided by Rule 56 (the summary
judgment rule).
The notes of the Advisory Committee state that the addition
of the motion to dismiss for failure to join an indispensable
party as a seventh defense was made to cure an omission in the
rules, which failed to state how this defense was to be raised.8
Various methods had been adopted in the courts to remedy
this deficiency, and, of course, the defense could always be
raised by the answer.9
The other amendment to Rule 12 (b), permitting the intro-
duction of extraneous evidence (affidavits, depositions, or
other matter outside the pleading) in support of a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, was made to settle a
point which was much disputed in the courts and by com-
mentators.10 The chief argument made against the admission
of extraneous evidence, and for restricting the motion to an
attack on the face of the pleading, was that the defense pro-
vided for by Rule 12 (b) (6) was failure to state a claim, and
that this meant something different from the failure to have
T Subdivision (b) of Rule 12, allowing these defenses to be made by motion,
considered in connection with subdivision (g), which permitted the objections
to be made in- successive attacks, was deplored as indicating a tendency ". . . to
return to the common-law hierarchy of defensive pleadings and the junking of
a hundred years' effort .to eliminate purely technical distinctions between pleas
in abatement and pleas in bar." Cleary, Book Review, 57 Yale L. J. 672, 675
(1948). Clark argues against the use of preliminary motions to present these
defenses, and contends that real reform calls for the use of the English system.
Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 465-67 (1943). See Inf ra, text at foot-
note 44.
8 Notes of Advisory Committee, 28 U.S.C.A. p. 120 (Supp. 1949).
9 See, for example, United States v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 36 F.
Supp. 399 (E.D.Pa. 1941) (motion for judgment on the pleadings); Paper
Container Mfg. Co. v. Dixie Cup Co., 74 F.Supp. 389 (D. Del. 1947) (motion to
dismiss). Grave doubts may be raised as to the whole concept of the "indis-
pensable party" as a "jurisdictional defect." See infra, text at footnote 50.
10 For citation of authority, see Notes of the Advisory Committee, 28 U.S.C.A.
p. 121 (Supp. 1949). See also Brown, supra note 6, at 423-28; Clark, Simp;ife
Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 466-67 (1943).
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a claim in fact.- It was further argued that the defense pro-
vided for by Rule 12 (b) (6) was simply the old demurrer
with a new name, and that extraneous evidence was never ad-
missible in support of demurrer since it would then become a
"speaking demurrer," bad at common law. 12 It was contended
that the admission of such evidence in support of the motion
would eliminate Rule 8 (c) (providing for affirmative de-
fenses) and Rule 56 (b) (motion by defendant for summary
judgment) .'3
Judge Clark favored the admission of extraneous evidence
in suppt)rt of this motion. His argument was that the exclu-
sion of such evidence makes the ".... form and nomenclature
of motions of perhaps decisive significance." 14 This is true,
since it is clear that if the motion had been labeled one for
summary judgment, such evidence would be admissible. Fur-
thermore, Rule 6 (d) (governing motions) and Rule 43 (e)
(governing evidence on motions) expressly provide for the
use of affidavits in support of motions, and there is no pro-
vision made in the rules for the exclusion of such affidavits
when a motion is made pursuant to Rule 12 (b) (6).15
The Advisory Committee felt that authority should be given
to the trial courts to permit the introduction of such evidence,
and the amendment therefore expressly grants this authority.16
However, the Committee felt that if such authority were
given, a' definite basis should be had for the disposal of the
motion.17 This desire was achieved by specifically providing
in the rule that a motion made under 12 (b) (6) is to be
treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56 when
extraneous evidence is offered by the movant and received by
the court. Since Rule 56 then governs the disposition of such
a motion, certain ambiguities in the prior practice have been
resolved and the argument that there might be a "battle of
affidavits" has been obviated.' 8
"1 See Brown, supra note 6, at 423-28; Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D.
456, 466-67 (1943); Clark, Code Pleading 540 et seq; note, 30 Calif. L. Rev. 92
(1941).
12 Ibid.
's Ibid.
14 Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 466 (1943).
15 See Brown, supra note 6, at 425 et seq.
1 Notes of the Advisory Committee, 28 U.S.C.A. p. 121 (Supp. 1949).
17 Ibid.
is Ibid. The committee emphasized that where a conflict on a material issue
was disclosed by the affidavits, there could be no judgment on the merits. Prior
to "tying in" the motion under Rule 12 (b) with the summary judgment rule,
certaih questions could be raised in cases where extraneous evidence was admit-
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Rule 12 (c) provides that after the pleadings are closed, a
party may move for judgment on the pleadings. It was
amended to permit the introduction of extraneous evidence
in support of such a motion, and, in such cases, the rule states
that the motion is to be treated and disposed of as a motion
for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56. Thus, this amend-
ment serves the same purpose as the corresponding amend-
ment to Rule 12 (b). Since the motion for judgment on thO
pleadings raises at a later stage a question similar to that
raised by the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
the same reasoning justifies this amendment as justifies the
amendment to Rule 12 (b).19
Rule 12 (d) provides for a preliminary hearing on motions
raising the defenses enumerated in subdivision (b), except
when otherwise ordered by the court. Though Judge Clark
argued for a rule similar to that found in the English sys-
tem, 20 which allows a preliminary hearing prior to trial only
in cases where the judge believes that the hearing of the
motion would substantially dispose of the case,2 1 no such
amendment was adopted. The only amendment made was that
providing for a preliminary hearing on a motion to dismiss
for failure to join an indispensable party. The amendment
was made necessary, of course, by the amendment to sub-
division (b) which added this seventh defense. 22
Rule 12 (e) provided for a motion for " . . . a more definite
statement or for a bill of particulars of any matter Which is
not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to
enable... (a party) properly to prepare his responsive plead-
ing or to prepare for trial." This rule was amended to strike
out all references to a bill of particulars. As the rule now
reads, a party may move for a more definite statement only
if a pleading is so ambiguous that it is impossible to prepare
a pleading responsive to it.
The original Rule 12 (e) was the subject of more judicial
ted. (1) Will the notice of hearing of the motion be the five day period called for
by Rule 6 (d) or the ten day period provided for by Rule 56(c) ? (2) The effect
to be given to an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6).
See Brown, supra note 6, at 427-28. In General, see 2 Moore, Federal Practice
112.09 (2d ed. Cum. Supp. 1948).
19 Notes of the Advisory Committee, 28 U.S.C.A. p. 12 (Supp. 1949); Clark,
Code Pleading 554-56 (2d ed. 1947).
20 Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 465 (1943).
21 The Rules of the Supreme Court, (England), Order XXV, Rules 2 and 3
(1883).
22 Notes of the Advisory Committee, 28 U.S.C.A. p. 121 (Supp. 1949).
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ruling than any other single rule.2 Although the rule provided
for a more definite statement or a bill of particulars, it was in-
tended that there should be no distinction between the two
devices, and that their purpose should be identical. 24 That pur-
pose was to require a clarification of a pleading when neces-
sary to enable the movant to prepare a responsive pleading.25
Thus the motion for a bill of particulars was not allowed to
obtain evidence, since such information was to be ob-
tained by the use of discovery devices.2" Nor was the
motion granted merely to obtain a particularization of the
pleading, since particularization was not to be required at
the pleading stage, Rule 8 (a) requiring merely general plead-
ing.27
Since it was decided that the motion under Rule 12 (e) was
to aid in the preparation of a responsive pleading, trouble
arose over the use of the words "to prepare for trial" in the
rule as originally promulgated, some believing that the use
of these words permitted them to demand a detailed statement
of the claim that was to be met at trial.2 However, as the note
of the Advisory Committee states, many courts, in denying
such a motion, in effect read these words out of a rule.29 It
has been suggested that the meaning of the phrase was re-
stricted to the situation where an affirmative defense was
stated ambiguously in the answer.30 Since no responsive plead-
ing is filed to such defenses in federal practice, the motion
could be used only to clarify the issues for trial (hence, "to
prepare for trial"). As the rule now stands, no such motion
will be allowed, since no responsive pleading is allowed, and
any such clarification of issues will have to be made in a pre-
trial conference.
Judge Clark advocated the complete abolition of the motion
23 Notes of the Advisory Committee, 28 U.S.C.A. p. 121 (Supp. 1949); Clark,
Simplified Pleading 2 F.R.D. 456, 466 (1943).
24 2 Moore, Federal Practice §12.17 (2d ed. Cur. Supp. 1948) ; 1 Moore, Federal
Practice £12.07 (1938); Ilsen, Recent Developments in Federal Practice and
Procedure, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 271 (Rev. ed. 1947).
25 Ibid.
26 1 Moore, Federal Practice 912.07, pp. 656-57 (1938); Ilsen, op. cit. supra
note 24, at 278.
27 Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 467 (1943); Notes of the Advisory
Committee, 28 U.S.C.A. p. 122 (Supp. 1949).
28 Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 467 (1943); Ilsen, op. cit. supra
note 24, at 276-77.
29 Notes of the Advisory Committee, 28 U.S.C.A. p. 122 (Supp. 1949).
so Ilsen, op.cit. supra note 24, at 276-77.
• 239
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for a more definite statement or a bill of particulars."' How-
ever, an argument has been advanced that such a motion
serves a useful purpose in complicated cases to enable a party
to plead properly.8 2 The argument emphasizes the less expen-
sive nature of this motion as compared with the use of depo-
sitions and other discovery devices provided by the rules.33
The Advisory Committee apparently accepted this view. An
argument may be made, however, that the demand for a
more definite statement is generally an expression of dissat-
isfaction with the general pleading called for by Rule 8, and
that the use of the motion has as its real purpose the limiting
of issues at the pleading stage.3 '
Remaining unanswered is the question arising in the situa-
tion where the moving party knows the facts, but the plead-
ing is ambiguous. Should the court grant a motion for a more
definite statement in such a case? Some federal courts have
taken the position that under such circumstances the movant
does not need a more definite statement to prepare a respon-
sive pleading, and that therefore the motion should be denied.33
It has been argued, however, that the defendant is entitled to
know what the plaintiff claims the facts to be, and hence de-
fendant's knowledge should not defeat the motion. 36 While
this is the position taken by many courts on the question,"
it is to be remembered that the function performed by the bill
of particulars and the motion to make more definite and cer-
tain in state procedure is not the same as in federal procedure.
In state procedure, one of the chief functions performed by
the bill of particulars and the motion to make more definite
and certain is to define and limit the issues at the pleading
32 Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 467 (1943).
32 Ilsen, op. cit. supra note 24, at 272-75.
as Ibid.
34 Cf. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 466-67 (1943); See also Fee,
The Lost Horizon in Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 48
Col. L. Rev. 491 (1948). The thought is there expressed that the pleading rules
are inconsistent. On the one hand, the rules provide for a very general form of
pleadings. On the other hand, there are devices to protect the paper pleadings.
The thesis is advanced that a pre-trial conference is necessary to determine the
issues of law and fact to be tried in complicated cases under a general pleading
system.
35 See cases pro and con cited by Ilsen, op. cit. supra note 24, at 282.
Be Ibid. In support of this position see 2 Moore, Federal Practice §12.18(2)
(2d ed. Cum. Supp. 1948).
37 See, e.g., Matter of Herle, 157 Misc. 352, 283 N.Y. Supp. 588 (1935).
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stage 5 Thus, regardless of defendant's knowledge, the plain-
tiff's statement of the case is of great importance.
Rule 12 (f) provided for a motion to strike out redundant,
immaterial, impertinent, and scandalous matter. The amend-
ment to the rule provided that, in addition, a motion to strike
"any insufficient defense" could be made 9 The Advisory
Committee noted that some courts had been troubled by the
omission in the rules of any specific method of raising this
question, though it had been permitted in one way or another.40
Two questions have been raised as to this amendment. First,
since it was thought desirable to give the express right to
strike an insufficient defense, it is questioned why it was not
thought equally desirable to grant the correlative right to
strike an insufficient claim. 41 Secondly, it has been suggested
that a motion to strike out an insufficient defense supported
by matter outside the pleadings should be allowed, and should
be treated as a motion for summary judgment, as was done in
similar cases in respect to motions pursuant to Rule 12 (b)
and (c) .42 Since Rule 56 (d) provides for a partial summary
judgment, it would seem that if a motion to strike a defense
is made, and extraneous evidence is received by the court in
support of it, the motion should be treated as one for sum-
mary judgment notwithstanding the mislabel. 43
Rule 12 (g) provides for the consolidation of motions. As
originally drawn, it required a party to join in one motion all
defenses then available to him. If he did not join all the de-
fenses and objections then available to him, he could not later
present such a defense by motions, except for the defenses pro-
vided for by Rule 12 (b) (1) to (5).
This rule, considered in conjunction with the provision in
Rule 12 (d) for preliminary hearings, allowed defenses to be
stated in three stages. The defendant could first make a motion
38 Caskey and Young, The Bill of Particulars - A Brief for the Defendant,
27 Va. L. Rev. 472 (1941).
39 There was no method of attacking any pleading after the complaint in the
original rules.
40 Notes of the Advisory Committee, 28 U.S.C.A. p. 122 (Supp. 1949).
41 Armstrong, Report of the Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure Recommending Amendments, 5 F.R.D. 339, 344 (1946).
42 Id. at 345.
43 Authority pro and con on this question is cited in 2 Moore Federal Practice
112.21 (3), n. 36 (2d ed. Cum. Supp. 1948). Moore calls the decision denying
the admission of evidence outside the pleading "technical," but states that a
court which receives such evidence may not be "technically correct" in view
of the explicit provisions allowing for the receipt of such evidence in Rules 12 (b)
and (c) and the absence of a similar provision in Rule 12 (f).
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setting forth one of the defenses enumerated in Rule 12 (b)
(1) to (5). If the movant lost on this motion, he was then
required to join in one motion all the remaining objections
then available to him which may be raised by motion under
Rule 12. Thus the defenses of failure to state a claim, the mo-
tion for a more definite statement, and the motion to strike
could next be raised by motion. Lastly, the answer could be
interposed."
The rule, as amended, eliminates one of the first two stages
of preliminary hearings. As the rule now reads, a party who
resorts to a motion to raise the defenses specified in Rule 12
must include in one motion all defenses then available to him.
Defendant waives any defense omitted except as provided in
Rule 12 (h). The purpose of the amendment was to avoid the
delay resulting from two separate motion hearing stages.
5
Criticism has been made of the consolidation required by
this rule."6 It has been contended that a motion for a more
definite statement should be permitted without waiving the
right to make subsequent motions.'7 The thought is that the
granting of a motion for a more definite statement may fur-
nish the basis foi a dismissal of the action on the face of the
complaint." However, it seems clear that generally the only
result of successive motions is delay.
Rule 12 (h) provides for a waiver of all defenses which a
party does not present by motion, or if no motion is made, by
44 See Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 465-66 (1943); Clark, Code
Pleading 540-41 (2d ed. 1947).
45 Notes of the Advisory Committee, 28 U.S.C.A. p. 122 (Supp. 1949); 2
Moore, Federal Practice §12.22 (2d ed. Cum. Supp. 1948). It is to be remembered
that only those defenses available but not presented at the-time the motion is
made are waived.
46 Armstrong, supra note 41 at 343; Armstrong, Second Draft of Proposed
Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 31 A.B.A.J. 497, 499-500 (1945).
47 Ibid.
48 Armstrong, supra note 41, at 343, n. 24. Armstrong suggests a situation in
which defendent moves for a more definite statement though he knows the
facts that make venue improper. The motion is sustained and the allegations
showing the improper venue are then inserted in the complaint. Could the de-
fendent then move to dismiss for improper venue, or was the defense waived
since available and not asserted at the time the motion for a more definite
statement was made? Armstrong suggests that the defense must be made in
the answer and could not be raised by motion. This seems wrong, for by the pro-
visions of Rule 12(b), the defense would be waived except in cases where
no motion was made. See 2 Moore, Federal Practice §12.22, 12.23 (2d ed. Cum.
Supp. 1948). Armstrong feels that practice would be simplified if the motion for
a more definite statement were first permitted and then the motion to dismiss.
It should be noted that there is a question whether a motion for a more definite
statement may be used as preparatory for a motion to dismiss in any case. See
2 Moore, Federal Practice §12.18 (4) .(2d ed. Cum. Supp. 1948).
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the answer, with certain exceptions. These exceptional de-
fenses which are not waived originally numbered three: fail-
ure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; failure
to state a legal defense to a claim; and lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter. The amendments added a fourth defense:
the failure to join an indispensable party. Thus if the consoli-
dation of defenses required by Rule 12 (g) is not made, all
defenses except the above four are waived.4 9
The note of the Advisory Committee states that the ... aa-
dition of the phrase relating to indispensable parties is one
of necessity." o Moore states that the failure to join an in-
dispensable party "... is a matter of such substance that an
appellate court may properly consider the defect although
the point was not raised in the trial court." 11 The tendency
to treat non-joinder of an indispensable party as a "juris-
dictional" error is fallacious, since clearly a person cannot
legally be affected by a judgment in an in personam suit to
which he has not been made a party. Nevertheless, by Rule
12 (b) and 12 (h), this approach seems established in the
Federal Rules.
49 See 2 Moore, Federal Practice §12.23 (2d ed. Cum. Supp. 1948).
50 Notes of the Advisory Committee, 28 U.S.C.A. p. 122 (Supp. 1949).
51 2 Moore, Federal Practice §12.23, p. 2332 (2d ed. Cum. Supp. 1948).
